

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 AEC-11 AF-10 ARA-16 CIAE-00

DODE-00 EA-11 EUR-25 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NASA-04

NEA-14 NSAE-00 NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01

RSC-01 SCI-06 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 (ISO) R

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APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:RHMILLER

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P 081731Z JUL 74

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY

UNCLAS STATE 146326

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: PARM

SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER/IKLE PRESS CONFERENCE

DISTO

FOLLOWING ARE USEFUL EXCERPTS FROM IKLE/SCHLESINGER PRESS
CONFERENCE OF JULY 3 SUPPLEMENTING "HIGHLIGHTS" CARRIED
BY USIA WIRELESS FILE. FULL TEXT BY INTERNATIONAL MAIL.

1. FROM SCHLESINGER OPENING STATEMENT: "THE LIMITATION
EMBODIED IN THE TTB WILL COME INTO FORCE IN SOME 21 MONTHS'
TIME. THAT WILL GIVE US TIME ON THE ONE HAND TO COMPLETE
THE UNDERSTANDING AND THE AGREEMENT WITH REGARD TO PNE'S.
AT THE SAME TIME, IT WILL PERMIT THE COMPLETION OF CERTAIN
DEVELOPMENTS THAT ARE UNDERWAY IN THE AEC PROGRAM. AT
THE COMPLETION OF THIS 21-MONTH PERIOD, WE WOULD EXPECT
THAT ALL FURTHER HIGH-YIELD TESTS WILL BE TERMINATED BY
THE TWO PARTIES TO THE AGREEMENT. WE WILL BE PURSUING THE
EXCHANGE OF GEOLOGICAL AND OTHER TEST SITE DATA TO ENSURE
THAT IT IS ADEQUATE FOR EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PURPOSES."

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2. FROM IKLE OPENING STATEMENT: "IN 1963 THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY WAS SIGNED TO PROHIBIT NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS IN THE ATMOSPHERE, OUTERSPACE AND UNDERWATER. THIS LEFT UNDERGROUND WEAPONS TESTS TOTALLY UNRESTRICTED EXCEPT FOR A BAN ON RADIOACTIVE DEBRIS THAT WOULD CROSS

INTERNATIONAL BORDERS. NOW, WE AND THE SOVIET UNION HAVE MOVED BILATERALLY TO LIMIT OURSELVES FURTHER IN REGARD TO UNDERGROUND TESTS. THE NEW TREATY NOT ONLY PUTS AN END TO ALL MEGATON TESTS, IT PUTS THE THRESHOLD AT 1/6TH OF ONE MEGATON.

"FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF LONG-TERM PROGRESS IN ARMS CONTROL, THIS THRESHOLD TEST BAN INCLUDES A COUPLE OF IMPORTANT PROVISIONS. AS YOU WELL KNOW, VERIFICATION IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF ANY ARMS CONTROL MEASURE. THE SOVIETS HAVE NOW AGREED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WILL BE CARRIED OUT AT ONLY DESIGNATED TEST AREAS, THAT THE LOCATION OF THEIR TEST AREAS WILL BE FURNISHED TO US, AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT, THAT WE WILL EXCHANGE DETAILED GEOLOGICAL INFORMATION REGARDING THE TEST LOCATIONS. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF CONFIDENCE THAT OUR INSTRUMENTS WILL TELL US THE YIELD OF THE WEAPONS EXPLODED. MOREOVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE AGREED TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON A COUPLE OF CALIBRATING SHOTS TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR ACCURATE DETERMINATION OF NUCLEAR YIELD.

"THE TREATY ALSO PROVIDES THAT A SEPARATE AGREEMENT WILL BE REACHED TO COVER THE QUESTION OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. THIS IS HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF CONTROLLING NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, ESPECIALLY IN LIGHT OF OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY TO SHARE THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS FROM PEACEFUL APPLICATIONS OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WITH NON-NUCLEAR STATES. IT IS IMPORTANT TO DEVELOP A SET OF AGREED PROCEDURES FOR PEACEFUL EXPLOSIONS, AS AND IF THEY BECOME TECHNICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY FEASIBLE, TO DISTINGUISH THEM CLEARLY FROM WEAPONS TESTS AND MAKE SURE THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE USED FOR WEAPONS PURPOSES.

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"THIS THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY IS NOT THE FINAL WORD IN THE LIMITATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTING. WE EXPRESS IN THIS TREATY OUR INTENTION TO MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF A COMPLETE, COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN AND TOWARDS THIS GOAL A SIGNIFICANT STEP FORWARD HAS NOW BEEN TAKEN."

3. FROM Q'S AND A'S:

"Q: MR. SECRETARY, WHAT IS THE AEC PROGRAM UNDERWAY THAT YOU SPECIFIED EARLIER?

"SEC. SCHLESINGER: THERE ARE, OF COURSE, DEVELOPMENTS UNDERWAY THAT DEAL WITH THE FUTURE SLBM PROGRAMS--THE TRIDENTS, THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE PROGRAM. THERE ARE

DEVELOPMENTS UNDERWAY WITH REGARD TO MINUTEMAN WARHEADS AND THERE IS UNDER DEVELOPMENT AN IMPROVED WEAPON FOR THE BOMBER FORCE.

"Q: MR. SECRETARY, MR. NITZE THE OTHER DAY MADE SOME STATEMENTS ON THE HILL WHICH INDICATED THAT HE DID NOT APPROVE OF THE MANNER IN WHICH WE HAVE BEEN DEALING WITH THE SOVIETS, I.E., ON A PIECEMEAL BASIS--THE THRESHOLD AND THEN THE ABM AND EVEN MIRV, THAT THIS MIGHT ACT AGAINST OUR LONG-TERM INTERESTS IN GETTING ESSENTIALLY A PERMANENT AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. CAN YOU COMMENT ON HIS OBJECTIONS?

"SEC. SCHLESINGER: I THINK THAT MR. NITZE HAS EXPRESSED HIS VIEWS. THERE IS ALWAYS A CONFLICT BETWEEN THOSE WHO FEEL THAT THE BEST APPROACH IS TO WAIT UNTIL ONE CAN CONCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT AND NOT FILL IN ANY OF THE DETAILS. THE POSSIBLE OBJECTION TO THAT IS THAT YOU MAY WAIT MORE OR LESS ETERNALLY. THE OTHER APPROACH IS TO REACH AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE PRACTICAL STEPS THAT WILL LIMIT ARMS IN EFFECTIVE WAYS, AT THE SAME TIME RETAINING AN ARMS BALANCE. TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN DO THAT, THEN WE ARE ABLE TO ACHIEVE AGREEMENTS WHICH ARE CONCRETE STEPS WHICH DO NOT AWAIT THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH A COMPREHENSIVE AGREEMENT.
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"Q: WHAT ABOUT THE OTHER SIDE OF MR. HOFFMAN'S QUESTION, THAT THE THRESHOLD IS SO HIGH THAT IT'S REALLY MEANINGLESS, THAT NEITHER SIDE AT THIS POINT WAS GOING TO BE TESTING THAT SIZE WEAPON ANYWAY, SO WHAT WE'VE SIGNED IS IN EFFECT A RATIFICATION OF UNILATERAL DESIRES TO STOP TESTING THINGS THAT BIG ANYWAY?

"DR. IKLE: THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE THRESHOLD IS TOO HIGH OR TOO LOW IS PERHAPS A BIT LIKE THE QUESTION WHETHER A GLASS OF WATER IS HALF EMPTY OR HALF FULL. IT CERTAINLY DOES LIMIT MEGATON TESTS, IN FACT DOWN TO ONE-SIXTH OF A MEGATON YIELD, AND THIS HAS AN IMPORTANT IMPACT ON FUTURE POSSIBILITIES, AS THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MENTIONED, FOR OPTIMIZING HIGH-YIELD WEAPONS. ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS

CONSISTENT WITH OUR CAPABILITY FOR VERIFYING YIELDS OF UNDERGROUND TESTS, AND FOR WORKING OUT THESE PROCEDURES FOR THE FIRST TIME FOR EXCHANGING GEOLOGIC DATA AND TESTING OUT THE VERIFICATION PROCESS FOR THIS KIND OF A THRESHHOLD LEVEL.

"Q: YOU MEAN AT THIS STATE OF THE ART WE COULDN'T HAVE VERIFIED, QUANTIFIED ANYTHING LESS THAN 150 MEGATONS?

"DR. IKLE: PRECISELY HOW MUCH YOU COULD VERIFY, WHETHER IT'S 140, 150 OR 160, OF COURSE YOU GET INTO GRAY AREAS AND MATTERS OF DEGREES, MATTERS OF JUDGMENT AND EVEN THE EXPERT SEISMOLOGISTS DISAGREE PRECISELY HOW FAR DOWN OR UP YOU SHOULD GO. BUT THIS WAS A LEVEL WHICH WE AGREED ON WHICH PERMITTED US TO MOVE NOW, AND TO LIMIT THE LARGE HIGH-YIELD TESTS. RATHER THAN TRYING TO EXPLORE PRECISELY HOW FAR DOWN YOU COULD PUSH THE THRESHHOLD, IT SEEMED VALUABLE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THIS THRESHHOLD NOW.

"SEC. SCHLESINGER: I THINK THAT IT'S FAIR TO SAY THAT WE REGARD A 150 KT LIMIT AS A LIMITATION ON THE OPPORTUNITY FOR OURSELVES TO DEVELOP IMPROVED WEAPONS. I AM SURE THAT OUR SOVIET COUNTERPARTS REGARD THAT AS A LIMITATION ON THEIR ABILITY AND THAT THE 150 KT THRESHHOLD DOES IN FACT CONSTRAIN BOTH SIDES; CONSTRAINS BOTH SIDES
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IN A WAY THAT IS UNIFORM TO BOTH SIDES.

''', '''

"Q: MR. IKLE, IS THERE ANY UNDERSTANDING, CLARIFICATION, OR OTHER KINDS OF AGREEMENT THAT DEFINE SUCH THINGS AS PARA. 2, ART. 1, OF THE UNDERGROUND TEST, ABOUT WHAT THE MINIMUM NUMBERS OF TESTS THAT CAN BE CONDUCTED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT?

"DR. IKLE: THERE ARE NO ADDITIONAL UNDERSTANDINGS OR CLARIFICATIONS THAT I KNOW OF AND THIS RESTRAINT, I THINK, IS AN IMPORTANT ONE, BUT IT HAS TO BE WORKED OUT AS WE MOVE ALONG ON THE PERMITTED TESTING." SISCO

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 JUL 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE146326
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: PRMAYHEW
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: N/A
Film Number: n/a
From: SECSTATE WASHDC
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19740767/aaaaceyp.tel
Line Count: 213
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: martinml
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 19 SEP 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <19 SEP 2002 by ThomasVJ>; APPROVED <15 JAN 2003 by martinml>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SCHLESINGER/IKLE PRESS CONFERENCE
TAGS: PARM
To: GENEVA
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005